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Abstract
Human rights and international business are two concepts that rarely go hand in
hand, largely owing to their conflicting purpose. On one hand, human rights are
generally there to safeguard humans from abuse, whether from the state or
international actors such as corporations. On the other hand, international
business, driven by multinational corporations, is premised on capitalist ideals
around profit maximisation. However, there is a growing recognition that the
human rights element can no longer be ignored, largely because of the negative
externalities that corporations often pass on to wider communities, without
sufficient safeguards or obligations imposed on them. This article examines the
state of current international initiatives and argues that the soft law element renders
them largely ineffective. The authors therefore support a movement towards a
binding treaty on business and human rights.
Introduction
Since the late 20th century, there has been growing discontent over the state of
current corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives designed to hold
multinational corporations (MNCs)1 accountable for the abuses they commit when
*Dr Chrispas Nyombi, Senior Lecturer in International Economic Law, Canterbury Christ Church University,
UK).**Tom Mortimer, Director of Law, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK.1One of the first and most recognised definitions of an MNC came from David Lilienthal, who indicated that it
was “corporations … which have their home in one country but which operate and live under the laws and customs
of other countries as well”: quoted in David Fieldhouse, “The Multinational Corporation” in Alice Teichova et al.
(eds),Multinational Enterprises in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.10.
However, this definition may be outdated, since some corporations are beginning to have multiple national origins,
such as Royal Dutch Shell and the Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever. Thus, it could be more appropriate to define
an MNC as any corporation that manages, owns and controls inbound fabricating assets in excess of a single state.
A similar approach was taken by Neil Hood and Stephen Young, The Economics of Multinational Enterprise (London:
Longman, 1979), p.3, which was subsequently supported by John Dunning,Multinational Enterprises and the Global
Economy (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1993), pp.3–4.
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operating in their global business capacity.2 However, throughout this period, the
commitment to creating binding international law rules has not waned but rather
intensified. At the time of writing, there are continued discussions led by the United
Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights for the purposes of
“implement[ing] the Guiding Principles [on Business and Human Rights]
and promot[ing] dialogue and cooperation on issues linked to business and
human rights, including challenges faced in particular sectors, operational
environments or in relation to specific rights or groups, as well as identifying
good practices”.3
Moreover, in 2016, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council at the 31st
session explored the prospect of a CSR treaty, which continues to be negotiated
at UN level.4 The underlying goal is to create a treaty concerning business and
human rights. The aim of this article is threefold. First and foremost, it examines
the post-war initiatives designed to regulate the activities of MNCs. Secondly, it
examines the main international initiatives that are in force today and their
limitations, before reaching a circumspect conclusion.
CSR through the imperfect lens of political history
The origin of what is now known as human rights can be traced back to an historical
rule of law, which limited the sovereigns’ absolute power.5 One of the earliest and
best-known records of human rights was Magna Carta, which was incorporated
into UK law in 1215.6Magna Carta protected rights that are crucial in international
law, for example, equity before the law, property rights and religious freedoms.
However, the term “human rights” was not coined in international law until after
the drastic loss of human life and the environmental devastation of the Second
World War.7 In the aftermath, the UN was created, which conveyed human rights
to the heart of international law.8Article 1(3) of the UN Charter states that one of
the purposes and principles of the UN is
2Michael Barnett, “Stakeholder Influence Capacity and the Variability of Financial Returns to Corporate Social
Responsibility” (2007) 32 Academy of Management Review 794, 807. The author indicated that although CSR is
voluntary, businesses should look to follow CSR, as it could help profits; Chrispas Nyombi, Andreas Yiannaros and
Rhidian Lewis, “Corporate Personality, Human Rights and Multinational Corporations” (2016) 27 I.C.C.L.R. 234,
247, 248; Maria Gonzalez-Perez and Liam Leonard, International Business, Sustainability and Corporate Social
Responsibility (Bingley: Emerald, 2013), pp.153, 154; Markos Karavias, Corporate Obligations under International
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.83, 114, 115; Ciprian Radavoi and Yongmin Bian, “Enhancing the
Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Case for ‘Decoupling’ Environmental Issues” (2014) 16 Env. L.
Rev. 168, 173; Dima Jamali and RamezMirshak, “Business-Conflict Linkages: RevisitingMNCs, CSR, and Conflict”
(2010) 93 Journal of Business Ethics 443, 445, 446.3The next session was on 27–29 November 2017, Geneva (Switzerland). See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues
/Business/Forum/Pages/ForumonBusinessandHumanRights.aspx (Accessed 17 November 2017].4UN Human Rights Council, 31st Session (Geneva, 29 February to 24 March 2016), Report on the first session
of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises
with respect to human rights, with the mandate of elaborating an international legally binding instrument, on 5
February 2016. This document can be found at “Report on the first session of the open-ended intergovernmental
working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with the
mandate of elaborating an international legally binding instrument”, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC
/GEN/G16/018/22/PDF/G1601822.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed 11 June 2017].5Rhona Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, 6th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.5.6 Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (2014), p.5.7 Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (2014), p.5.8Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, 24 October 1945 (UN Charter). The UN has 193 Member States,
and each of these States is a member of the UN General Assembly.
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“to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.9
Furthermore, arts 55 and 56 indicate that all members must follow the wishes of
the UN by promoting “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms”.10 The global reach of the UN is undeniable, since nearly
all entities that are recognised as states are members of this organisation and
therefore adhere to the protection of human rights. Moreover, the UN established
various internal institutions, such as the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights in 1946, a political body that protects, monitors and supervises the
implementation of human rights.11 Additionally, the UN adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was the first instrument that set out
protected fundamental freedoms.12 It was reaffirmed in the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action that the UDHR is the cornerstone of international human
rights law.13 Furthermore, although 8 out of the 56 states of the UN abstained from
the UDHR in 1948,14 all current 193 states of the UN have accepted the Declaration
as a condition of membership. The UDHR is so important that 10 December is
still celebrated in many states as international human rights day, and theGuinness
Book of Records believes that the UDHR is the “most translated document” on
earth.15 Despite the UDHR’s overwhelming global human rights achievements, it
has not led to the development of CSR rules that could hold MNCs accountable
for abuses.
The UDHR is not a legally binding instrument; thus it can only act as a persuasive
mechanism in enforcing and protecting international human rights. However, the
norms of the UDHR are crystallised in customary international law, since its terms
are cited frequently by international actors, such as state governments and courts.16
This notion could be further supported by the fact the UDHR defines human rights
very similarly to that of the peremptory international norms in the provisions of
the UNCharter.17 Furthermore, the norms of the UDHR are enriched in two binding
9United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, art.1(3).10United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, art.55, art.56.11 See its successor the Human Rights Council created in 2006, which is an inter-governmental body that protects
and promotes human rights.12United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, General Assembly resolution 217(III) A. The
Declaration is part of the UN, which means all 193 UN Member States must submit to the Declaration.13UN Doc A/CONF 157/23 (1993), 25 June 1993, endorsed by GA Res 48/121 of 14 February 1994.14The following states voted in favour of the Declaration: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia,
Luxembourg,Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Thailand, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, the UK, the US, Uruguay, Venezuela. The following states abstained: Belarus,
Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic and Slovakia), Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Ukraine, USSR (apart from
Belarus and Ukraine, which were UN members and part of the USSR—the other states were: Russia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan), Yugoslavia (Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and also the entity
Kosovo).15 Francesca Klug, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 60 Years On” [2009] P.L. 205, 206.16Louis Sohn, “The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals rather than States” (1982) 32
American University Law Review 1, 15–17; Klug, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” [2009] P.L. 205,
206.17Sarah Joseph and AdamMcBeth,Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2010), p.316.
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treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)18 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).19
Thus, the principles of the UDHR are cemented in binding legal mandates that
most states are parties to, which means the UDHR is extremely influential in the
recognition and protection of international human rights. Moreover, the UDHR,
ICCPR and ICESCR are collectively named the International Bill of Human Rights,
which demonstrates their importance in the development of human rights.
Furthermore, after the creation of the UHDR in 1948, no new standards were
adopted until 1965,20 with the exception of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,21 relating to decolonisation and
the rise of self-determination. However, the period around the 1980s saw a rise of
core human rights development with the introduction of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),22 the
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT),23 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).24
Although academics, for example Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth, suggest that
those developments were “another lull in standard setting”, these developments
nevertheless contributed to the rapid advancement of international human rights,
since many states uphold the human rights that the conventions aim to recognise
and protect.25 However, there were some developments that could be classified as
a “lull in standard setting”, for example, the Declaration on the Elimination of
Intolerance based on Religion or Belief,26 the Declaration on the Right to
Development (DRD),27 and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People,28
which all failed to gain binding recognition in international law. Furthermore, the
18Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). Some of the rights
that the treaty protects are; the right to life, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, electoral rights, freedom of
assembly, and rights to a fair trial and due process. This treaty has 168 state parties.19Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). The ICESCR
aims to protect rights such as the right to; health, education, an adequate standard of living and labour rights. This
treaty has 164 state parties.20 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Opened for signature
7 March 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969). The treaty outlines that its members must
promote understanding among all races and eliminate racial discrimination. It has 177 state parties.21GARes. 1514 (VX) of 14 December 1960, UNDoc A/4684 (1960). 89 states voted in favour, none voted against
but 9 abstained: Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the UK and the US.
Except for the Dominican Republic, the rest of those abstaining states were major colonial powers.22Adopted by GA Res. 34/180 of 18 December 1979. Opened for signature 18 December 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
(entered into force 3 September 1981). It is considered an international bill of rights for women, and therefore it aims
to protect the rights of women. It has 189 state parties. The US and Palau have signed but not ratified the convention,
whereas the Holy See, Iran, Somalia, Sudan and Tonga have not even signed the convention.23Adopted by GA Res. 39/46 of 10 December 1984. Opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(entered into force 26 June 1987). It is an international human rights treaty, under the review of the United Nations.
Its purpose is to prevent torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment around the world. States
must prevent torture in any territory under their jurisdiction and are not allowed to transport individuals to any other
state where there is a belief they will be tortured. The convention has 159 state parties.24Adopted by GA Res. 44/25 of 20 November 1989. Opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force 2 September 1990). The convention outlines children’s economic, civil, social, political, health
and cultural rights. According to the Convention a child is any human being under the age of 18, unless the age of
majority is attained earlier under a state’s domestic legislation. It has 196 state parties, and the only UN member that
is not a party to the convention is the US. Other entities party to the convention are the Cook Islands, Niue, the State
of Palestine, and the Holy See.25 Joseph and McBeth, Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law (2010), p.3.26GA Res. 36/55 of 25 November 1981. This declaration aims for freedom of religion or belief.27GA Res. 41/128 of 4 December 1986. The declaration outlines that every individual should have economic,
social and cultural development rights.28GA Res. 61/295 of 13 September 2007. Although the declaration is not binding, it was adopted by a majority of
144 states in favour, 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine).
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1990s and 2000s saw the adoption of optional protocols, which can only be
considered advisory.29 It is likely that this soft law approach or crust to international
human rights law has rubbed off international CSR, thereby hindering any move
towards binding rules.
From a global economic perspective, corporations are growing in power and
influence.30 Some MNCs have enough economic power to influence the domestic
politics of States, which could lead to the overthrow of democratically elected
government.31 Although MNCs began to develop in the 16th and 17th centuries,
with the introduction of European colonial trading companies,32 themodern structure
of MNCs that supports productive integration across borders did not appear until
the mid-19th century.33However, this is not to say that abuses committed byMNCs
did not occur before the 19th century. One of the most notable examples of historic
MNC abuse was instituted by the British-owned East India Company in the 18th
century.34 The East India Company was originally formed to trade in silks and
spices. However, owing to the lack of regulation in India to monitorMNC practices,
the East India Company quickly turned from a friendly trading company into a
destructive power that took over Southeast Asia with its 260,000 strong army. The
company was obsessed with profit, and thus had little regard for human rights
when maximising their assets, which resulted in human rights abuses. However,
despite a huge British contribution to the modern industrial economy, which is
evident from their investment in products in North America, most of these
29 See, Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, adopted by GA Res
44/128 of 15 December 1989, opened for signature 15 December 1989 (entered into force 11 July 1991); Optional
Protocol to the CEDAW, adopted by GA Res. 54/4 of 6 October 1999, opened for signature 10 December 1999
(entered into force 22 December 1999); Optional Protocol Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Pornography and Child Prostitution, adopted by GARes. 54/263 of 25May 2000, opened for signature
15 May 2000 (entered into force 18 January 2002); Optional Protocol Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, adopted by GA Res. 54/263 of 25 May 2000, opened for signature 25
May 2000 (entered into force 12 February 2002); Optional Protocol to the CAT, adopted by GA Res. 57/199 of 18
December 2002, opened for signature 4 February 2003 (entered into force 22 June 2006).30 Peter Muchlinski,Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
p.3; Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller,Global Reach: The Power of Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1974); Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 1999), p.327;
David Korten,When Corporations Rule the World (West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press, 1995).31This occurred when the American MNC ITT contributed to the overthrow of the socialist Allende government
of Chile. It could be considered as one of the events that occurred because of the cold war of communism and
capitalism, betweenmainly the US and Soviet Union: see discussion in TheodoreMorgan,Multinational Corporations
and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp.252–253;
Anthony Sampson, The Sovereign State: The Secret History of ITT (London: Coronet, 1973), Ch.11; US Congress
Senate Subcommittee on Multinationals: Hearing on Multinational Corporations and US Foreign Policy, 93rd
Congress 2nd Session (US Government Printing Office 1974); Muchlinski,Multinational Enterprises and the Law
(2007), pp.3, 4.32 Francis Mann, Studies in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.200–203; Cecil Carr,
Select Charters of Trading Corporations (London: Selden Society, 1913); Michael Likosky, The Silicon Empire:
Law Culture and Commerce (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp.61–68; Nabob of the Carnatic v East India Company
(1791) 1 Ves. Jr 70; Michael Farelly, “Recent Questions of International Law: The British Government and the
Chartered Companies in Africa” (1984) 10 L.Q.R. 254; Ex-Rajah of Coorg v East India Company (1860) 29 Beav.
300; Bohdan Havrylyshyn, “The Internationalisation of Firms” (1971) 5 J.W.T.L. 72.33Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprises: American Business Abroad From the Colonial Era
to 1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). Wilkins indicated that American MNCs which have
contemporary MNC abilities of international divisions of productivity began to appear in the middle of the 19th
century; Lawrence Franko, The European Multinationals (London: Harper and Row, 1976). Franko emphasised that
the first real EuropeanMNCswere created in the mid-19th to the late 19th century; Ann Carlos and Stephen Nicholas,
“Giants of an Earlier Capitalism: The Chartered Trading Companies as Modern Multinationals” (1988) 62 Bus. Hist.
Rev. 398. The rapid development of technology, management and manufacturing in the 19th century contributed to
the current evolution ofMNCs: Alfred Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge,
MA:HarvardUniversity Press, 1990); JohnDunning,Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Wokingham:
Addison Wesley, 1993), Ch.5.34 Phillip Lawson, The East India Company: A History (London: Longman Group, third impression 1997).
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companies would not meet the contemporary definition of anMNC. This is because,
although these companies were incorporated in Britain and comprised British
directors, their assets were located and managed overseas, which meant that they
would conduct no operations in Britain or in more than one state. It was not until
the middle of the 19th century that the modern structure of MNCs began to form.35
It is argued by some academics that the first contemporary manufacturing MNC
was the American Singer SewingMachine Company.36This development supported
the growth of MNCs.37
However, the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 significantly hindered
the expansion of MNCs, since most companies and MNCs were taken over by
their respective governments with the goal of winning the war. Following the First
World War, there was not much MNC development, since there was a lack of
political and economic stability in the international community. First, there were
massive changes in state politics, such as the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the
adoption of fascist economic policies in Italy and Germany, and the break-up of
states, for example, the collapse of Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.38
Secondly, there was a breakdown of international financial markets in the late
1920s and early 1930s, known as the great depression.39 These two concerns and
the increasing threat of another war meant that the creation of MNCs was not
advisable, since investment in foreign markets would be extremely difficult and
unstable. Instead, companies in Europe were nationalised and businesses of the
same nationality merged together to create large corporations, which were then
used to create cartels in the international markets to weaken competitors.40Although
35Muchlinski,Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2007), p.10. Muchlinski believed that the mid-19th century
was the catalyst for the development of contemporary MNCs.36Christopher Tugendhat, The Multinationals (London: Pelican, 1971), p.33. Furthermore, although the American
Samuel Colt set up a company in 1852 in the UK to manufacture revolvers, the investment failed and the factory was
sold off in 1857. Despite the fact that the investment failed, some academics consider this as the first MNC; see
discussion in Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprises: American Business Abroad from 1914 to
1970 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp.37–45.37Chandler, Scale and Scope (1990), pp.71–79. Chandler indicated that the US was open to create MNCs, since
US recession in the domestic market made foreign markets more attractive, and the combination of new antitrust
laws and stockmarket conditions encouraged companies to bemerged into a giant corporation, theMNC,maintaining
interests in both home and overseas markets;Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprises (1970), pp.37–45.
Wilkins highlights the importance of America in the development of MNCs.38 Joseph Wilczynski, The Multinationals and East-West Relations (London: Macmillan, 1976), p.108. Foreign
companies that operated in the USSR could only operate as joint ventures with the Soviet State and its companies
under Lenin’s New Economic Plan. This was subsequently liquidated by Stalin, probably because of his fears of
international influence in Soviet politics, which he single-handedly dictated from Lenin’s death to his own death, For
further discussion on Stalin’s interesting reign over the USSR, see Michael Lynch, Access to History: Stalin’s Russia
1925–1953, 4th edn (London: Hodder Education, 2008), Wendy Goldman, Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and
Terror in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and John Hostettler, Law and Terror in
Stalin’s Russia (Chichester: Barry Rose, 2003); Pierre Jacquemot, La Firme Multinationale: Une Introduction
Economique (Paris: Collection Gestion Economica, 1990), p.25. Jacquemot indicated that in the early 20th century
important regions of the world were closed off to private foreign investment. For a discussion on Italy’s domestic
and foreign policy, see Denis Smith,Mussolini (London: Granada, 1983), pp.133–142, 219–220. Smith discusses the
rise of fascism in Italy and its effects on policy and investment; for a discussion on German domestic and foreign
policy, see Richard Overy, “German Multinationals and the Nazi State in Occupied Europe” inMultinational
Enterprises in Historical Perspective (1986), p.299. Overy discusses the rise of fascism in Germany and its effects
on policy and investment.39Tugendhat, The Multinationals (1971), p.39.40 Franko, The European Multinationals (1976), pp.95–96. The Swedish combine, Match, obtained national
production monopolies in host states by taking control of local competitors and thus attaining market control: Geoffrey
Jones,Multinationals and Global Capitalism: from the Nineteenth to the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), pp.57–60, 90–92, 122–123. The German combine IG Farben negotiated agreements with its
Swiss competitors: Harm Schroter, “A Typical Factor of German InternationalMarket Strategy: Agreements Between
US and German Electrotechnical Industries up to 1939” inMultinational Enterprises in Historical Perspective (1986),
p.160. German and US businesses negotiated market sharing agreements in the elector-technical sector: Chandler,
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American companies could not create cartels in the US, they nevertheless formed
cartels in Europe, since the Webb-Promerene Act 191841 gave them the ability to
create overseas cartels provided there was no adverse effect on competition in the
US.42
However, cartels delayed the development ofMNCs. The introduction of cartels
made creating MNCs extremely difficult, since many countries had exclusive
participation for certain companies, which meant that businesses could not freely
expand their manufacturing capabilities in other states. In contract, cartels kept
alive the development ofMNCs and globalisation, since they provided amechanism
for foreign companies to interact with each other and invest in foreign markets
when they was no other way to do so, since most states were pursuing the foreign
policy of isolationism, which meant that they avoided international affairs.
Furthermore, when international investment in the late 1930s began to exceed the
pre-war statistics, this led to US and British companies gradually setting up
subsidiaries in Europe, which the SecondWorldWar quickly put an end to.43When
the Second World War concluded in 1945, the growth of MNCs was no longer
drastically disrupted. However, the aftermath of the Second World War was
challenging for European and Japanese industries, since the assets of domestic and
overseas companies in these regions were commonly destroyed, expropriated, or
nationalised.44 In contrast, US companies emerged virtually unscathed from the
Second World War, as they had evaded the destruction and seizure of assets that
most European companies had experienced, since the war did not take place in
North America. Furthermore, the US companies produced large sums of the
equipment used in the war, and thus their industries were experiencing high
investment and were better resourced than their competitors in Europe, for the
development of new technology, products, and the discovery of new markets.45
Moreover, there were many reasons for US companies to create MNCs after
the Second World War46 First, the Marshall Plan 1948 gave American aid to
Europe’s shattered economies, which brought opportunities for US companies to
Scale and Scope (1990), pp.356–366, 564–584; Richard Overy, “GermanMultinationals and the Nazi State in Occupied
Europe” inMultinational Enterprises in Historical Perspective (1986), p.299; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate
Economy, 92nd edn (London: Methuen, 1983), p.38; Tugendhat, The Multinationals (1971), pp.41–44. European
companies set up international cartels in the oil, steel and rayon sectors.41Webb-Promerene Act 1918 s.2. For more information on the significance of this act, see US v United States
Alkali Export Association Inc 86 F. Supp. 59 (1949).42 Franko, The European Multinationals (1976), pp.97–98. Franko argued that robust US antitrust laws rendered
the creation of cartels illegal; Tugendhat, The Multinationals (1971). Shell Anglo-Persian (BP) and Standard Oil of
New Jersey created a cartel in 1928 to protect their non-US interests. US businesses in 1933 entered the Second
International Steel Cartel with British, Australian, Chinese and Polish companies.43 John Dunning, “Changes in the Level and Structure of International Production: The Last One Hundred Years”
in Mark Casson (ed.), The Growth of International Business (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp.92, 93.
In 1938 there was 50% more foreign direct investment than in the pre-war period of 1914. Furthermore, UK and US
direct investment grew, with the UK holding 39.8% of the world’s capital stock, while the US held 27.7%; For a
discussion on British companies in the inter-war period, see Geoffrey Jones, “OriginsManagement and Performance”
in Geoffrey Jones (ed.), British Multinationals: Origins Management and Performance (Aldershot: Gower Business
History Series 1986); For discussion on American companies in the inter-war period, seeMiraWilkins, TheMaturing
Multinational Enterprises: American Business Abroad From 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1974).44David Shepard, Aubrey Silberston and Roger Strange, British Manufacturing Investment Overseas (London:
Methuen, 1985), p.13: 40% of British overseas assets were lost owing to the events of the Second World War.45Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (London: Pelican, 1971), pp.91–101. The investment given to American
companies in the Second World War meant that they were able to fund and develop new products.46Neil Hood and Stephen Young, The Economics of Multinational Enterprise (London/New York: Longman,
1979), pp.11–12; Tugendhat, The Multinationals (1971); Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (1971), pp.91–101.
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invest in Europe.47 Secondly, the new international financial trading system
established by the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)),48 International Monetary Fund (IMF),49 and General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),50 recognised the US dollar as the
dominant currency for international dealings, and the removal of tariff barriers to
trade significantly decreased the cost of cross-border trade. Additionally, the
removal of these restrictions enabled companies to set up manufacturing industries
in more than one state, thereby encouraging the creation of MNCs. Thirdly, the
USGovernment allowed tax-free profits for companies investing abroad.51 Fourthly,
significant advancement in international communication and transport enabled
improved control of subsidiaries operating abroad. Fifthly, European governments
encouraged US investment to raise employment and the standard of living. Thus,
there is no surprise that the US led the development in MNC creation after the
Second World War. The dominance of US companies is evident, as from 1938 to
1960 they contributed two-thirds of both the overall international investment and
the creation of new subsidiaries. Furthermore, by 1960 they had overwhelmingly
overtaken the UK as holding the highest total world stock at 49.2 per cent, whereas
the UK was second, holding 16.2 per cent.52
However, in the 1950s, Europe was starting to recover from the devastation of
the Second World War, as European companies were beginning to contribute
meaningfully to international investment and create subsidiaries in foreign
jurisdictions.53 Moreover, the creation of the European Economic Community in
195754 breathed fresh life into European industrialisation and investment.
Furthermore, the total amount of world stock that the US andUK held was declining
in the 1960s, and although in the mid-1970s the US contributed to 50 per cent of
total foreign direct investment (FDI), in 1985 it had fallen to 25 per cent.55 In
contrast, Western Europe in 1985 contributed 50 per cent of FDI, and it was not
just Europe that was rising.56 Japan in the 1950s began investing in Latin America,
and in the 1960s started to invest in its neighbouring states.57 Furthermore, the
relaxation of exporting restrictions in Japan’s economic policy in the 1970s led to
47 In contrast, the Truman Doctrine 1948 discouraged investment in communist states, such as the USSR.48World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) 1944.49 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 1945.50General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into
force 1 January 1948).51This is no longer in operation for US companies.52Dunning, “Changes in the Level and Structure of International Production” in Casson (ed.) The Growth of
International Business (1983), pp.93–94. Moreover, in 1960 France was third with 6.1% of the total world stock
while Germany had 1.2% and Japan 0.7%. See fn.143 for more information.53Franko, The European Multinationals (1976). In the 1950s German companies were beginning to buy back their
previously confiscated foreign industries, particularly in Latin America, and rebuild their international sales network.
The Italian companies Fiat and Olivetti started setting up subsidiary manufacturing industries in Europe and Latin
America; Julien Savary, FrenchMultinationals (London: Francis Pinter, 1984), p.2. French companies began to make
a significant impact on the motor and tyres sector, and the export markets in general.54European Union, Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version), Rome Treaty, 25March
1957. In 1993, the EEC was renamed the European Community (EC), and in 2009 it was absorbed into the European
Union (EU).55Dunning, “Changes in the Level and Structure of International Production” in The Growth of International
Business (1983), p.94. There was a rise in the total world stock held by Germany, Switzerland and Japan.56UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in World Development: Trends and Prospects (NewYork: United Nations,
1988, UN Doc ST/CTC/89), p.74.57TerutomoOzawa,Multinationalism, Japanese Style: The Political Economy of Outward Dependency (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.13–14. In the 1950s, Japan made investments in the production of iron,
steel and mining in mostlyMexico, Argentina and Brazil. In the 1960s, Japan invested in Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan
and Hong Kong.
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a rapid rise in Japanese investment, particularly in the developed states of Western
Europe and America, which lowered restrictions on Japanese imports.58
Consequently, Japanese investors were making healthy profits in the developed
states and thus continued investing, especially in the US.59 Although the US was
no longer comfortably superior with regard to FDI, it was now superior in securing
foreign investments within its territory.60 This is evident from the fact that foreign
investment in the US multiplied by 7.5 between 1975 and 1986, since the US
economy maintained good prospects while the international economy stalled, and
the depreciation of the dollar made investment in the US cheap.61
In contrast, the 1990s marked the growth of investment in developing states,
and by the 21st century the emergence of BRIC, made up of Brazil, Russia, India
and China, led to newwaves in the international investment market.62China became
the leading developing host state for investment in 1996, and by 2003, China had
overtaken the US as the world’s leading host state for investment.63However, even
with the recent developments, the Western states and Japan have some of the most
powerful MNCs in the world.64 MNCs are able to bring states that do not have
many corporations or investors into the global economy. This is especially evident
since services in developed states are the continuingly dominant sector over
manufacturing and raw material; therefore these MNCs that mainly concentrate
on manufacturing need to invest in other states to maintain profits.65 However,
considering the rapid rise of MNCs, it is surprising that there are no international
binding rules that guard againstMNCs committing human rights and environmental
58Ozawa,Multinationalism, Japanese Style (1979), p.16. The relaxation of strict governmental controls and
restrictions on capital export encouraged Japanese direct foreign investment; Michael Yoshino, “Japan as Host to the
International Corporation” in Charles Kindleburger (ed.), The International Corporation (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1977), p.373. The US gave Japanese investors fewer restrictions on importing Japanese goods to the US;
Lawrence Franko, The Threat of Japanese Multinationals: How the West can Respond (New York: Wiley Series on
Multinationals, 1983), p.71. The European states gave Japanese investors fewer restrictions on importing Japanese
goods to Europe; Louis Turner, “Industrial Collaboration with Japan” (RIIA/RKP Chatham House Papers No.34,
1987). Japanese collaboration with American and European industrial companies has been common since the late
1990s.59 In the US, Japanese investors made healthy profits in the manufacturing and services sector.60Edward Graham and Paul Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 2nd edn (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 1991). In 1990, the UKwas the largest US investor at 26.8%, Japan was second
with 20.7%, the Netherlands third, holding 15.9%, and Canada fourth with 6.9%.61UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in World Development: Trends and Prospects (NewYork: United Nations,
1988, UN Doc. ST/CTC/89), p.74; However, the US invested in Europe to create MNCs which would counteract the
Single European Market 1992 that made it harder for foreign traders operating outside Europe to secure investments
in Europe.62UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1993 (New York: United Nations 1993), pp.16–18. The developing states
which hosted the most investment were in the order as follows: Singapore, Mexico, China, Brazil, Malaysia, Hong
Kong, Argentina, Thailand, Egypt and Taiwan. Most of these states were in East Asia, which suggests that investment
was heading to these regions. This statement is supported by UNCTAD,World Investment Report 1997 (New York
and Geneva: United Nations 1997), pp.208–209, which showed growing investment in East Asia at the end of the
1990s: see also UNCTAD,World Investment Report 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp.11–17.This rise in
investment in developing states was mainly down to the stagnation in the economy of the developed states. MNCs
believed that it was better to invest in developing states than developed states at this time.63UNCTAD,World Investment Report 1994 (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1994), pp.9–18; UNCTAD,
World Investment Report 1995 (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1995), p.12; UNCTAD,World Investment
Report 2005 (NewYork andGeneva: United Nations, 2005), p.xiii; Xiaoyang Zhang, “China’s draft Foreign Investment
Law: an envisioned new model for regulating foreign capital” (2016) 22 Int. T.L.R. 73.64 If MNCs of other states are going to overtake the MNCs of these traditional investment powerhouses, they need
to distribute foreign direct investment in other states, instead of relying on investment from the corporations of other
states to grow; for a similar discussion see Nagesh Kumar, Emerging Multinationals (London: Routledge, 2007);
Zhang, “China’s draft Foreign Investment Law” (2016) 22 Int. T.L.R. 73.65UNCTAD,World Investment Report 2004 (New York and Geneva: United Nations 2004). Around the beginning
of the 21st century, the service industry equated to 72% GDP in developed state economies, 57% in Central and East
European states, and 52% in developing states.
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abuses. Although there have been contemporary developments through the
introduction of free trade agreements (FTA), the Regional Economic Integration
Organisation (REIO)66 and the World Trade Organization (WTO),67 these only
regulate and place legal obligations in investment.68
Global initiatives for regulating MNC activity
This section aims to assess the current CSR initiatives, in chronological order, to
determine whether they could adequately hold MNCs accountable for abuses.
OECD Guidelines
The OECDGuidelines were established in 1976, becoming the first CSR initiative
that proposed to hold MNCs accountable for abuses.69 These guidelines were
designed for MNCs to contribute to social and economic progress,70 and for states
to follow international law standards when governing the undertakings of MNCs.71
To achieve these outcomes, the OECD Guidelines sought for MNCs to enhance
society when initiating FDI in other states. This meant that MNCs should not only
pursue business or commercial related policies, but should also consider how their
investment could benefit society, and the best ways of using their investment to
society’s advantage. Some of the guidelines issued were for MNCs to pursue
improved industrial and employment relations, for example, to respect employees’
right to trade unions, to abolish child labour, and to employ and train local people.72
Furthermore, it was outlined that MNCs should protect the environment, which
could be achieved by setting up policies that pursue improved environmental
performance, to review these policies, and to assess and tweak their continuing
relevance to current environmental issues.73Additionally, MNCs should contribute
to the local development of science and technology, which could address local
needs, and to employ and train locals.74 Moreover, MNCs must avoid and combat
bribery, pay taxes to enhance the host state in which they are operating, protect
consumer interests, such as the safety and quality of goods, and avoid
anti-competitive practices, for example price fixing.75
These guidelines could be considered significant, since they have been expanded
in the 21st century, which means that they are still contemporary and relevant. In
66Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO) 1996.67World Trade Organization (WTO) 1995.68FTAs have chapters on freedom of investments; REIOs aim to implement free movement of investment, and the
WTO outlines and protects the rights of the investor.69TheOrganisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD)Declaration andDecision on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976) 15 I.L.M. 967.70OECD Declaration and Decision on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976) 15 I.L.M.
967, para.2; “OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises” (2011), para.2, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne
/48004323.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].71OECD Declaration and Decision on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976) 15 I.L.M.
967, para.9; “OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises” (2011), para.9, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne
/48004323.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].72“OECDGuidelines onMultinational Enterprises” (2008), pp.17–18, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428
.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].73“OECDGuidelines onMultinational Enterprises” (2008), pp.19–20, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428
.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].74 “OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises” (2008), p.23, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428
.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].75“OECDGuidelines onMultinational Enterprises” (2008), pp.21, 22, 24, 25, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne
/1922428.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].
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2000, a revised version was presented outlining that MNCs should respect the
human rights of the individuals affected by their activities,76 and further revision
in 2011 added a whole chapter on an MNC’s relationship with human rights.77 The
2011 edition built upon the 2000 version, since it required MNCs to mitigate the
risks of committing human rights abuses against individuals affected by their
business activities, and to remedy any human rights abuse. However, although
these guidelines strive to integrate CSR into international law, their significance
is limited since they are not binding.78 Furthermore, the 2000 and 2011 editions
confirm that these guidelines are only soft law by repeating the exact wording of
the original document that “observance of the Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary
and not legally enforceable”.79Moreover, the domestic laws of states overrule these
guidelines; therefore, if there is a conflict of rules, the domestic laws would
prevail.80 Thus, the guidelines only offer MNCs encouragement to have CSRs,
which means there will be no consequences for MNCs that contravene the
guidelines, apart from reputational damage. However, MNCs have a desire to
enhance their reputation to avoid a public backlash which could weaken profits.
Nike and Gap lost profits and shareholder investment when it was revealed that
their sub-contractors were using child labour in third-world states; therefore, it is
in an MNC’s interests to follow the guidelines.81 However, there is no tool used
to evaluate whether CSR standards are implemented in business practices.82 Nike
and Gap’s association with child labour was discovered by a specific campaign
which could not conceivably hold all MNCs accountable.83
Conversely, the guidelines attempt to hold MNCs accountable for abuses by
urging all the contracting states of the OCED to set up national contact points
(NCPs) to allow claims to be made against an MNC for failing to follow the
guidelines.84 These NCPs must strive for visibility, accessibility, transparency and
accountability; therefore, states must ensure that the public are aware of the
availability of the NCPs and publish information about them. States need to ensure
the public can access the NCPs, and the dealings or activities of the NCP should
be made public when possible.85 The NCPs will seek advice from the Committee
76 “OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD” (2000)
p.20, Pt II, Ch.2, art.2, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/1922428.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].77“OECDGuidelines forMultinational Enterprises” (2011), Pt I, Ch.IV, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323
.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].78OECD Declaration and Decision on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976) 15 I.L.M.
967.79 “OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises” (2008), p.12,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/1922428.pdf; OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2011), p.17, http:/
/www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [Both accessed 18 November 2017].80 “OCED Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (2011), p.17, Pt I, para.2, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne
/48004323.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].81Dwight Justice, “The International Trade Union Movement and the New Codes of Conduct” in Rhys Jenkins et
al. (eds), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002), p.327; Kenneth
Amaeshi, Onyeka Osuji and Paul Nnodim, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains of Global Brands: A
Boundaryless Responsibility? Clarifications, Exceptions and Implications” (2008) 81 Journal of Business Ethics 223,
223; Klein, No Logo (1999), p.327.82 Sol Picciotto, “Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business” (2003) 42 C.J.T.L. 131, 142;
Joris Oldenziel, The Added Value of the UN Norms: A Comparative Analysis of the UN Norms for Business with
Existing International Instruments (Amsterdam: SOMO Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations, April
2005), pp.11, 12, 13.83Naomi Klein, No Logo (1999), p.327.84 “OCED Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (2011), Pt II, pp.68, 71–74, 77–88, http://www.oecd.org/daf
/inv/mne/48004323.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].85“OCEDGuidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2011), Pt II, p.79, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323
.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].
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on International Investment andMultinational Enterprises (CIME)when evaluating
whether anMNC has breached the guidelines.86Despite only 35 of the world states
being current members of the OECD, most of these are the world’s most advanced
states, which have most of the world’s MNCs.87 This means that NCPs could act
as a suitable mechanism in preventingMNC abuses andmaintaining the application
of the OECD guidelines, as it covers most of the world’s MNCs, for example,
Western Europe, North American, and Japanese MNCs.88 However, a severe
limitation of the NCPs and the CIME is that they have no enforcement powers.
The CIME lacks enforcement powers, since “the non-binding nature of the
Guidelines precludes the Committee from acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial
body”.89 Furthermore, NCPs lack enforcement powers, as they rely heavily on the
good faith of the parties in order to evaluate claims.90 Moreover, if the parties act
in good faith, the NCP can only outline recommendations for them to follow.91
Thus, the NCP only performs advisory, clarification, and consultative roles;
therefore, these guidelines only act as mere moral initiatives, which means that
they are not a major deterrent to MNCs bent on human rights or environmental
abuses.
ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles
The Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy was set up in 1977 by the International Labour Organisation (ILO),
an agency of the UN, to guard against MNC abuses in labour standards and social
policy issues, since MNCs are extremely influential in the economies of most
states and in international economic relations.92 The entities that should follow
these guidelines are states, MNCs and employers.93 It contains guidelines on
employment, which aims to lower unemployment, for there to be equality of
opportunity and treatment in employment to lower discrimination, and security
86“OECDGuidelines onMultinational Enterprises” (2008), pp.33–35, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428
.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].87The states that are parties to the OECD are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the UK, the US. Furthermore, the OECD works closely with emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and
India, and developing economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.88For a discussion on the world’s MNCs, see section “CSR through the imperfect lens of political history” above.89 “OCED Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (2011), Pt II, p.88, para.44, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne
/48004323.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].90 “OCED Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (2011), PtII, p.81, para.21, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne
/48004323.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017]91 “OCED Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (2011), Pt II, pp.84–85http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne
/48004323.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].92Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess.,
17 November 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, pp.1–2, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent
/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].93Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess.,
17 November 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, pp.1–2, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent
/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].
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and stability for employees in employment.94 There are further guidelines that
cover the training of workers, conditions at work and industrial relations.95
Despite the Tripartite Declaration being formed back in 1977, it could be
considered contemporary, since it was amended twice in the 21st century in 2000
and 2006, which means that it maintains relevance in international law.96 One of
these amendments was to abolish child labour, whereby MNCs “should respect
the minimum age for admission to employment or work”.97 Furthermore, the
Tripartite Declaration might be significant, as it urges all parties to respect the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),98 one of the key mechanisms
that protects human rights.99However, although the Tripartite Declaration protects
fundamental human rights norms, its effectiveness in preventingMNCs committing
abuses is limited, as it is entirely voluntary.100 The Declaration indicates that parties
are only “recommended to observe on a voluntary basis”,101 and “in keeping with
the voluntary nature of the Declaration, all of its provisions, whether derived from
ILOConventions and Recommendations or other sources, are recommendatory”.102
There are no express provisions in the guidelines that require MNCs abide by the
Tripartite Declaration, or any enforcement mechanism that could prosecuteMNCs
for abuses. Although parties are obliged to complete a survey regarding their
experience of implementing the guidelines,103 MNCs cannot be forced to follow
the Tripartite Declaration as it lacks the essential legal mandate, and requires public
influence for wrongdoers to correct their behaviour.104 Furthermore, the survey is
limited as there is no evidence outlining whether anMNC has filled out the survey
correctly, since the Declaration lacks the monitoring capabilities to ensure MNCs
abide by the guidelines, which means MNCs could mislead when following the
guidelines.
94Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess.,
17 November 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, pp.4–6, paras 13–28, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp
/---emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 16 May 2017].95Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess.,
17 November 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, pp.6–10, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent
/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].96Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy” (2000)http://www
.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf [Accessed
18 November 2017]; Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,
ILO, 279th Sess., 17 November 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/--
-emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].97Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess.,
17 November 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, para.36, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent
/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].98United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, General Assembly Resolution 217(III) A. The
Declaration is part of the UN, which means all 193 UN Member States must submit to the Declaration.99Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess.,
17 November 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, para.8, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent
/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].100Oldenziel, The Added Value of the UN Norms (April 2005), p.15; Phillip Rudolf, “Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises” in Ramon Mullerat (ed.), Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Corporate Governance of the 21st Century (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2005), p.219.101Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess.,
17 November 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, p.13, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent
/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].102Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess.,
17 2000 (2002) 41 I.L.M. 187, para.8, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/documents
/publication/wcms_101234.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].103“ILOTripartite Declaration Follow-up Survey”http;//www.ilo.org/empent/Informationresources/WCMS_101251
/lang—en/index.htm [Accessed 16 May 2016].104Rudolf, “Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises” in Corporate Social
Responsibility (2005), p.219.
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UN Global Compact
The United Nations Global Compact was founded in 2000 on the principle that
public-private collaboration is crucial to discovering permanent solutions to
persistent global challenges.105 There are 10 principles associated with the UN
global compact, which cover human rights, labour, the environment, and
anti-corruption.106 The two human rights principles aim for MNCs to respect and
support the protection of human rights, and to avoid committing acts or omissions
that violate human rights. There are three environmental principles that, first, aim
to deterMNCs from undertaking business practices that may harm the environment;
secondly, encourage MNCs to promote and commence business policies that
command enhanced environmental responsibility; and thirdly, support the
development of environmentally friendly technology. The only principle on
anti-corruption outlines the abolition of all forms of corruption, while the four
labour principles deal with issues such as the prevention of forced and compulsory
labour.107However, some of these principles, especially the human rights principles,
are very broad.108 This vagueness has had an impact on the effective application
of the Global Compact, since it is harder to prosecute MNCs which act contrary
to the compact. Nonetheless, these principles are derived from influential human
rights instruments, such as the UDHR,109 the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development,110 the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,111 and the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption.112 Thus, the significance of the principles cannot be
underestimated, since these principles originate from norms that most of the world’s
states have either accepted or ratified.113
Furthermore, the UNGlobal Compact has over 13,000members from 165 states,
which means that it has the potential to prosecute MNCs for abuses owing to its
global reach.114 It is the largest non-binding corporate responsibility initiative in
the world.115Although the Compact has great potential because of the large number
105United Nations Global Compact (31 January 1999). It was launched in July 2000 after it was introduced by the
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in Davos on January 1999. The aim of the UN Global Compact is to promote
among the business participants in the initiative, 10 agreed principles of responsible corporate citizenship that embrace
the UN’s universal values in four areas of action: human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption: “United
Nations Global Compact”, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about [Accessed 18 November 2017].106“The Ten Principles of the UNGlobal Compact”, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles
[Accessed 18 November 2017].107The other three labour principles deal with the elimination of child labour, the removal of discrimination from
employment, and calling for the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining to be upheld.108Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UN Norms” (April 2005), p.11.109United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, General Assembly Resolution 217(III) A.
The Declaration is part of the UN, which means all 193 UN Member States must submit to the Declaration.110Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), UN Doc. A/CONF151/26 (Vol.I)/31 I.L.M. 874 (14
June 1992). It proclaims 27 principles, and has over 170 state parties111 International Labour Organization (ILO), ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
(1988), Adopted at its 86th Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998. Paragraph 2 indicates that all 187 state parties of the ILO
must promote and act in accordance with the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining. Furthermore, they must eliminate all forms of forced or compulsory labour, eliminate
discrimination in employment and occupation, and adhere to the effective abolition of child labour.112Convention against Corruption, Adopted by GA Res. A/58/422 on 31 October 2003 (entered into force 14
December 2005). It is the first binding international anti-corruption instrument, which has 71 articles divided into 8
chapters, It has 178 state parties, and the only UN states that have not ratified the convention are: Andorra, Barbados,
Belize, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Japan, Monaco, North Korea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Somalia, Suriname, Syria, and Tonga.113 See footnotes directly above for further description.114 “United Nations Global Compact”, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ [Accessed 18 November 2017].115 “United Nations Global Compact”, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about [Accessed 18 November 2017].
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of participants and states that are parties to it, it cannot be considered a threat to
MNC practices unless it is binding or sufficiently enforceable.116 Its significance
is further restricted, like many soft law initiatives, by the enforcement mechanisms
which require MNCs to specify that they adhere to the guidelines without actually
endorsing them in practice.117 For instance, althoughMNCs are required to produce
an annual report detailing how they have progressed or implemented one of the
10 principles in their business practices, very few members correctly abide by
these reporting requirements.
The Compact has been criticised for its lack of credibility.118 This is because
member participation is extremely low, as only 14 per cent had participated in
international meetings, and only 14 per cent had ventured on to the Global Compact
website to make submissions on the online learning forum.119 Furthermore, the
members that participated in these activities frequently failed to illustrate how they
incorporated the Compact’s principles into their business practices. In response
to these pejorative findings, a new sanctioning mechanism entitled “Integrity
Measures” was established.120 This new review instrument meant that if an MNC
failed to convey its “communication on progress” report within a year, it would
be considered as “non-communicating”, and if the MNC failed to communicate
this report within two years, it would be delisted from the UN Global Compact,
and its name published for non-compliance. Although these processes signify
progress from the previous regime that unanimously failed to ensure that MNCs
abide by their agreed CSR standards, a number of academics remain unconvinced
on whether MNCs could be sufficiently held accountable for abuses under the
Compact, especially since past CSR initiatives failed to do so owing to their vague
and non-binding nature.121
Furthermore, in 2010, the UN Joint InspectionUnit reviewed theGlobal Compact
to assess its role and success.122 The Inspection Unit revealed that despite the
establishment of the “IntegrityMeasures”, the introduction of the “Communication
on Progress” as the reporting and self-evaluation mechanism failed to deliver
acceptable monitoring and verification of standards.123 Furthermore, the Inspection
Unit concluded that without clear management of complaints, the initiative lacked
the “teeth” to deter abuses. In contrast, the review discovered that the Compact
116 Justine Nolan, “The United Nations’ Compact with Business: Hindering or Helping the Protection of Human
Rights?” (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 445, 446.117Minna Halme, Peter Dobers and Nigel Roome, “Corporate Responsibility: Reflections on Context and
Consequences” (2009) 25 Scandinavian Journal of Management 1, 2; Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UNNorms”
(April 2005), pp.11–12.118McKinsey & Co, “Assessing the Global Compact’s Impact” (11 May 2004).119McKinsey & Co, “Assessing the Global Compact’s Impact” (11 May 2004), p.16.120 “United Nations Global Compact Note on Integrity Measures”, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about
_the_gc/Integrity_measures/Integrity_Measures_Note_EN.pdf ; “United Nations Global Compact Basic Guide
Communication on Progress”, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication_on_progress/Tools_and
_Publications/COP_Basic_Guide.pdf [Both accessed 18 November 2017].121Oldenziel, “The Added Value of the UNNorms” (April 2005), pp.11, 13; Halme, Dobers and Roome, “Corporate
Responsibility” (2009) 25 Scandinavian Journal of Management 1, 2.122UN Joint Inspection Unit, “United Nations Corporate Partnerships: The Role and Functioning of the Global
Compact” (2010), Doc. No.JIU/REP/2010/9 (Geneva: 2010), https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/archive/United
%20Nations%20corporate%20partnerships%20-The%20role%20and%20functioning%20of%20the%20Global
%20Compact.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].123UN Joint Inspection Unit, “United Nations Corporate Partnerships” (2010), pp.iii-iv, https://www.unjiu.org/en
/reports-notes/archive/United%20Nations%20corporate%20partnerships%20-The%20role%20and%20functioning
%20of%20the%20Global%20Compact.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].
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had contributed significantly to the private sector.124 The Global Compact was
praised for being a major landmark in the development of the relationship between
the private sector and the UN. The assessment of the Global Compact exposed a
lack of the coherency that could produce adequate entry conditions for potential
members, and an effective monitoring system that could determine whether its
members had implemented the principles.125 The Inspection Unit stressed that the
lack of a clear regulatory and institutional framework had drawn so much criticism
that it could limit the effectiveness of the Compact and damage its reputation.
The UN Draft Norms
In 2000, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights created a taskforce to evaluate the regulatory frameworks and activities
employed by MNCs.126 This development led to the creation of the Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights (UN Draft Norms). The UN Draft Norms directed
MNCs to respect, promote and protect both nationally and internationally
recognised human rights.127 The Draft Norms borrowed principles from numerous
instruments that adopted international codes of conduct for corporations, and
fundamental human rights norms, such as the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,128 the Rio Declaration on the Environment
and Development,129 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,130 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,131 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.132 The importance of the Draft Norms is further highlighted by the fact its
124UN Joint Inspection Unit, “United Nations Corporate Partnerships” (2010), p.1, para.2, https://www.unjiu.org
/en/reports-notes/archive/United%20Nations%20corporate%20partnerships%20-The%20role%20and%20functioning
%20of%20the%20Global%20Compact.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].125UN Joint Inspection Unit, “United Nations Corporate Partnerships” (2010), pp.iii-iv, https://www.unjiu.org/en
/reports-notes/archive/United%20Nations%20corporate%20partnerships%20-The%20role%20and%20functioning
%20of%20the%20Global%20Compact.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].126UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, “The Effects of the Working Methods
and Activities of Transnational Corporations on the Enjoyment of Human Rights”, Res. 2001/3, UN Doc
E/CN4/Sub2/RES/2001/3 (2001).127Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), para.1.128UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December
1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol.78, p.277, opened for signature 9 December 1948 (entered into force 12
January 1951). State parties must punish and prevent all actions of genocide, whether carried out in a time of war or
peace. It has 147 state parties.129Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), UN Doc. A/CONF151/26 (Vol.I) / 31 I.L.M. 874
(14 June 1992). It proclaims 27 principles, and has over 170 state parties.130Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Adopted by GA
Res. 39/46 of 10 December 1984, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26
June 1987). It is an international human rights treaty, under the review of the United Nations. Its purpose is to prevent
torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment around the world. States must prevent torture in any
territory under their jurisdiction and are not allowed to transport individuals to any other state where there is a belief
they will be tortured. The convention has 159 state parties.131 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). The ICESCR aims to protect rights such as the right to; health,
education, an adequate standard of living and labour rights. This treaty has 164 state parties.132 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). Some of the rights that the treaty protects are; the right to life, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, electoral rights, freedom of assembly, and rights to a fair trial and due process. This
treaty has 168 state parties.
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understanding of MNC business behaviour is analogous to the reputable UDHR
in its enunciation of fundamental human rights standards.133
Furthermore, the Draft Norms were intended to be legally binding on MNCs.134
However, the Draft Norms were abandoned,135 since there were concerns that they
would limit state responsibility and state sovereignty,136 as the human rights
obligations on MNCs were addressed to states.137 Instead, the failed Global
Compact138 was modified in the hope that its principles would be taken more
seriously.139 However, it is still not legally binding; therefore, although regarded
by some academics as significant,140 most regard it as a lost cause, since it fails to
impose human rights obligations on MNCs.141
Ruggie Principles
Despite the failure of the UN Norms and other CSR initiatives, enthusiasm in the
international community for binding international CSR rules did not wane. The
UN Secretary-General appointed John Gerard Ruggie, the co-author of the Global
Compact, to the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General to
find relationships between human rights and MNCs in order to establish a policy
framework.142 This included clarifying and classifying the human rights for which
MNCs should be held accountable and responsible, and to assess how states have
regulated MNCs when protecting human rights, for the purpose of addressing the
governance gaps betweenMNCs and human rights created by globalisation.143 The
133Denis Arnold, “Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights” (2010) 20 Business
Ethics Quarterly 371, 375.134Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN4/Sub2/2003/12/Rev2 (2003), paras 15–16; Arnold, “Transnational Corporations and
the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights” (2010) 20 Business Ethics Quarterly 371, 376.135Harmen van derWilt, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities”
(2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 43, 45.136Larry Backer, “On the Evolution of the United Nations ‘Project-Respect-Remedy’ Project: The State, the
Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context” (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law
37, 46.137 Simon Chesterman, “Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business Activities in Conflict Zones”
(2010/2011) 11 Chicago Journal of International Law 321, 327.138United Nations Global Compact (31 January 1999).139Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, UNDoc. E/CN4/Sub2/2003/12/Rev2 (2003), https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003
.html [Accessed 18 November 2017].140Celia Wells and Juanita Elias, “Corporate Complicity in Rights Violation” in Phillip Alston (ed.), Non State
Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.151.141David Kinely, Justine Nolan and Natalie Zerial, “The Norms are Dead! Long Live the Norms! The Politics
behind the UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations” in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell
(eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), p.459; Oliver de Schutte, “The Accountability ofMultinationals for Human Rights Violations
in European Law” in Non State Actors and Human Rights (2005), p.227.142UNESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 61st Session, Agenda Item 17, Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, UNDoc E/CN.4/2005/L.87 (2005). In this session theUNSub-Commission requested theUNSecretary-General
to assign a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to the issue of MNCs and human rights; Jan
Wouters and Ann-Luise Chane, “Multinational Corporations in International Law”,Working Paper No.129 (December
2013), p.15. This source confirms that John Ruggie was appointed UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General.143 “Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises”, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/SRSGTransCorpIndex.aspx. The other
relationships that John Ruggie was required to find between human rights and MNCs was to research and clarify the
implications for MNCs of concepts such as “complicity” and “sphere of influence”; to develop materials and
methodologies for undertaking human rights impact assessments of the activities ofMNCs; to compile a compendium
of best practices of states and MNCs; see Mary Varner, “Conference Report: Applying The Guiding Principles —
the Ius CommuneMeeting and Current Scholarship on the Ruggie Framework’ (2012) 9 EC Law 158, 158; Bhandary
Mangalpady, “Relationship between Business Corporations’ and Human Rights: A Legal Analysis”, SSRN, http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987032 [Both accessed 18 November 2017].
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end-result was the creation of three fundamental principles based on protection,
respect and remedy, which became known as the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (Ruggie Principles).144 The Ruggie Principles outlined
that states have an obligation to protect human rights under international law, and
MNCs have a responsibility to respect human rights and the requirement of an
effective remedy for victims who have suffered human rights abuses.
First, states must protect human rights; therefore, theymust implement legislation
that supports human rights, outline consequences for breaches of human rights
that would deter MNCs from committing abuses, and advise MNCs on the issues
of human rights. One of the advantages of the Ruggie Principles is that states could
independently incorporate human rights into their respective legal systems instead
of relying on an inflexible international system, since conceivable CSR solutions
could fluctuate from various societies, especially when comparing developed states
with third-world states which have differing legal systems in terms of efficiency
and development.145 Thus, a flexible system would avoid the complications
associated with incorporating international law into each of the world’s unique
domestic legal systems.
Furthermore, it is the duty of the state to protect its citizens, and states should
remain the exclusive bearers of human rights norms, since human rights abuse
commonly occurs in the territory of a state and therefore the state should implement
CSR regulations. However, although academics such as Markos Karavias146 and
Catherine Pedamon147 support the theory that states should apply CSR regulations,148
some domestic courts, particularly in third-world states, where the majority of
abuses occur, have legal systems that cannot adequately address human right abuses
committed by MNCs.149 This means that an MNC which has committed an abuse
could escape adequate prosecution, leaving the victim with an unsatisfactory
remedy. Thus, the Ruggie Principles place excessive reliance on the domestic
justice system of states to prosecute MNCs appropriately.150 The limitations of this
reliance are evident from the principle of corporate personality, which allows a
parent company to incorporate subsidiary companies in other states without being
held liable for the abuses that the subsidiary commits.151 Thus, litigation against
the subsidiary company would be held in the state where the abuse occurred.
However, problems arise especially in third-world states when the legal system is
144UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011); United Nations Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises,
‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights’, UN DocE/CN4/2006/97 (February
2006).145Chizu Nakajima, “The Importance of Legally Embedding Corporate Social Responsibility” (2011) 32 C.L. 257,
259.146Markos Karavias, Corporate Obligations under International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),
p.66.147Catherine Pedamon, “Corporate Social Responsibility: A New Approach to Promoting Integrity and
Responsibility” (2010) 31 C.L. 172, 176.148 See also Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits” (1970) NY Times
(Magazine), September 13, 1970, p.32; David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk: the Emergence of
Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal International Law
931, 953.149 Steven Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111 Yale Law
Journal 443, 461.150Uta Kohl, “Corporate Human Rights Accountability: The Objections of Western Governments to the Alien Tort
Statute” (2014) 63 I.C.L.Q. 665, 695, 696.151For further discussion see Part1.1 and Part2.4; Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22 HL at 29–32 (Lord
Halsbury LC), 51–54 (Lord Macnaghten).
Regulating Multinational Corporations: What are the Limitations in Existing
International Initiatives? 37
2018 Int. T.L.R., Issue 1 © 2018 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
not sufficiently devolved to adequately prosecute an MNC for its abuses. This is
evident from the Bhopal gas disaster, when the Indian legal system failed to
adequately reimburse the victims.152
Additionally, states could have difficulties in protecting human rights when
these rights conflict with the obligations they have under bilateral investment
treaties (BITs).153 States may prefer abiding by their obligations under BITs over
their international obligation to protect human rights. Moreover, as a result of rapid
globalisation, it is uncertain which states would bear the responsibilities for an
MNC’s human rights abuses, since they operate in several jurisdictions
simultaneously.154 Furthermore, states could be prevented from prosecuting an
MNC that commits human rights atrocities in other states that have relaxed their
human rights regulations to encourage investment, since prosecuting the MNC
would question that other state’s policies and laws, which would in turn breach
the important principle of state sovereignty. The principle of state sovereignty is
so highly regarded in international law that the UN Draft Norms were abandoned,
as there were fears that they would limit the principle; therefore, states could be
unable to universally protect human rights in the ways that the Ruggie Principles
expects.155
In comparison, MNCs are only required to respect human rights. The second
Principle outlined that MNCs must avoid committing or contributing to human
rights abuses, and remedy any abuses caused.156 Moreover, MNCs are required to
discover business techniques that would mitigate the risk of committing human
rights abuses in their corporate practices. In order for MNCs to respect human
rights, the Ruggie Principles recommended that MNCs implement a policy
commitment to respect human rights, a process that could remedy human rights
abuses, and a procedure that identified the impact of their business practices on
human rights.157 However, the Ruggie Principles failed to clarify exactly how far
down the supply chain of an MNC this respect for human rights was required.158
Despite the clear desire of the Ruggie Principles to hold MNCs accountable for
the human rights abuses they commit in their business practices,159 greater
clarification is essential to avoid these current ambiguities.
The purpose of the final Principle is to establish a remedy that grants victims
of abuses access to judicial protection. However, although the Principles specify
that states should examine, punish, and redress abuses, and that MNCs should
152 See Part2.4 and Part1.1 for further discussion; Union Carbide Corp v Union of India (1991) 4 S.C.C. 584;
Kenneth Amaeshi, Paul Nnodim andOsuji Onyeka,Corporate Social Responsibility, Entrepreneurship, and Innovation
(Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2013), pp.3, 33, 47; Antonio Nicita and Matteo Winkler, “The Cost of Transnational
Accidents: Lessons fromBhopal andAmoco” (2009) 43 J.W.T. 683, 684 704, 705; Joe Jackson andMaeveMcLoughlin
“Bhopal Disaster: Still Waiting for the Clean Up” (2008) 406 E.N.D.S. 32, 33, 35.153Abdi Aidid and Stephen Clarkson, “Researching International Norm Diffusion: Brazilian and Latin American
Resistance to Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, Annual Congress of the International Studies Association, San
Francisco (6 April 2013).154Varner, “Conference Report: Applying the Guiding Principles” (2012) 9 EC Law 158, 159.155Van der Wilt, “Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes” (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of
International Law 43, 45.156UNHRC, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie” (2001) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, para.13.157UNHRC, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie” (2001) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, para.15.158Varner, “Conference Report: Applying the Guiding Principles” (2012) 9 EC Law 158, 160.159UNHRC, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issues of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie” (2001) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, para.12.
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react to suspected abuses,160 there remain unanswered questions, such as the
capability of a judiciary to evaluate the efficiency of a remedy from the perspective
of a victim.161 Furthermore, as discussed above, some states cannot adequately
prosecuteMNCs for their abuses, as their legal systems require further development;
therefore, states cannot be trusted to provide remedies for victims ofMNCs abuses.
Thus, although the Ruggie Principles elucidated contemporary international human
rights and outlined how they could be incorporated into practice, their significance
is limited, since the objectives it aims to achieve may be easily disregarded by its
observers, and some of its principles are uncertain.162
Furthermore, the Ruggie Principles are not legally binding, as they do not intend
to “create new international law obligations”.163 In contrast, some commentators
have praised the Ruggie Principles for comprehensively bringing human rights
issues to international attention, and clarifying the distinction between the
obligations of states and the responsibility of MNCs.164 However, the significance
of the Ruggie Principles is limited, as the UN Secretary-General has suggested
that the Principles may not significantly develop since relevant international actors
lack capacity on issues such as business and human rights.165Although efforts have
been made to build such a capacity,166 the Ruggie Principles remain non-binding.167
Conclusion
From the analysis carried out this article, it is clear that the CSR initiatives fail to
hold MNCs accountable for abuses. Although each initiative identified crucial
human rights obligations that MNCs should respect, these initiatives are limited
as they are mere soft law. Thus, MNCs could simply claim that they abide by the
CSR initiatives for the benefit of improving their reputation, while disregarding
them in their corporate operations. Moreover, even if there was proof that anMNC
has committed an abuse, the initiatives lack the enforcement powers to prosecute.
It is a shame that these initiatives lack teeth, as most have admirable international
160United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issues of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises, “Protect, Respect, and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human
Rights”, UNDoc. E/CN4/2006/97 (February 2006), para.12; see “The UN ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ Framework
for Business and Human Rights”, para.17, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and
-materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2016].161Varner, “Conference Report: Applying the Guiding Principles” (2012) 9 EC Law 158, 161.162United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issues of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises, “Protect, Respect, and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human
Rights”, UNDoc. E/CN4/2006/97 February 2006, para.12; see “The UN ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ Framework
for Business and Human Rights”, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials
/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].163 “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”, p.1, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications
/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [Accessed 18 November 2017].164Susan Aaronson and Ian Higham, “‘Re-righting Business’: John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International
Human Rights Standards for Transnational Firms” (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 333, 336.165Human Rights Council, “Contribution of the United Nations system as a whole to the advancement of the
business and human rights agenda and the dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights”, Doc. No.A/HRC/21/21 (2 July 2012), para.6.166Human Rights Council, “Contribution of the United Nations system as a whole to the advancement of the
business and human rights agenda and the dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights”, Doc. No.A/HRC/21/21 (2 July 2012), paras 23–27; Human Rights Council, Summary of
discussions of the Forum on Business and Human Rights, prepared by the Chairperson, MakarimWibisono, UNDoc.
A/HRC/FBHR/2013/4 (2–4 December 2013).167JanWouters and Anna-Luise Chane, “Multinational Corporations in International Law”,Working Paper No.129
(December 2013), p.17. The author pointed out that the Ruggie Principles did not have enough substance, as they
were excessively focused on processes. Additionally NGOs have criticised the Ruggie Framework for imposing
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reach, since many states and MNCs are members. This means that the binding,
hard law element promised under the multilateral treaty on business and human
rights currently being negotiated at the UN level presents a good opportunity for
infusing human rights into international business once and for all.
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